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Abstract
In this paper, rms engage in rent seeking in order to be assigned a
governmental contract. We analyze how a change in the contract length
a¤ects the rms rent-seeking behavior. A longer contract leads to more
rent seeking at a contract assignment stage, as the rms value the contract
higher. On the other hand, the contract has to be assigned less often, which
of course leads to less rent seeking. Finally, a longer contract makes a possible
cooperation between the rms solving the rent-seeking problem more di¢ cult
to sustain.
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1 Introduction
A situation, where several rms compete for a governmental contract or
license, represents a typical example for a rent-seeking contest. During the
assignment process, each rm expends time and other resources in order
to convince the governmental agency that it is the right rm for the job.
These resource expenditures are wasteful to a large degree and an extensive
body of economic literature has analyzed the determinants of the rent-seeking
problem as a basis for possible solutions.1 What has almost received no
attention, however, is that a governmental contract or license is typically
awarded for a xed time period only.2 Moreover, the length of the contract
or license should a¤ect its value for the rms and, accordingly, their rent-
seeking expenditures. Building on this observation, the main objective of the
paper is to analyze, how long a contract or license should last in order to
tackle the rent-seeking problem optimally.
We di¤erentiate between two scenarios: In the rst one, the rms are not
able to enter a cooperation and so to solve the rent-seeking problem on their
own. Here, the optimal length of the governmental contract is determined
by a simple trade-o¤ of two countervailing e¤ects. On the one hand, a longer
(lasting) contract is more valuable for the rms so that they increase their
rent-seeking expenditures, if a contract has to be assigned. On the other
hand, such a contract assignment does of course take place less often, if the
1See, for instance, Tullock (1980), Dixit (1987), Leininger (1993), Nitzan (1994), Lee
(2000), Epstein & Nitzan (2002), Morgan (2003), Baik (2004), Konrad (2004) or Münster
(2006).
2Aidt & Hillman (2006), considering a dynamic model, in which rights to a rent may
be lost over time, represent a notable exception. See also McCormick et al. (1984) who
analyze the costs of monopoly and briey discuss the e¤ects of having a monopolist being
forced to continually spend resources in order to retain his status.
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contract length is increased. This, in turn, makes a longer contract more
attractive. Which of these e¤ects is dominant, will be shown to depend on
the specic form of the contest success-function. In particular, it depends on
whether the optimal rent-seeking expenditure is a concave, linear or convex
function of the contract value.3
In a second scenario, the rms may be able to sustain a cooperation (or
relational contract), under which each promises not to engage in rent seek-
ing.4 We nd that such a cooperation is easier to sustain, if the governmental
contract becomes shorter. To understand this result, notice that a coopera-
tion between the rms is sustainable, if and only if the gain from a unilateral
deviation from the cooperation is overcompensated by the triggered punish-
ment of the other rms. A rm gains from the deviation, as it becomes more
likely to be assigned the present contract. The shorter this contract, the
lower is its value for the rm and the less the rm gains from deviating to a
positive rent-seeking expenditure. Similarly, the rm is punished for a devi-
ation, as, starting with the next contract assignment stage, the other rms
reenter the match and the situation becomes more wasteful. Here, a shorter
contract yields an earlier and thus more signicant punishment, as it takes
less time until the next contract has to be assigned. To sum up, a shorter
contract reduces the gain from a deviation, while, at the same time, leading
to a stronger punishment. As both e¤ects work into the same direction, a
3Aidt & Hillman (2006) nd similar e¤ects in their analysis. However, they assume the
rent to be always fully dissipated. Obviously, the total rent-seeking outlay then increases
linearly in the rent and both e¤ects cancel out. In this respect, the current model may be
seen as a generalization of their model. Furthermore, the current model also allows the
contestants to enter a cooperation, which is not the case in the model by Aidt & Hillman.
4By introducing a possible cooperation between the rms into the analysis, the paper
is related to Gürtler (2006). There, a rent-seeking theory of the rm is developed, which
contains a similar cooperation as a main ingredient.
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shorter contract makes the cooperation easier to sustain.
Before we proceed, note that a governmental agency assigning a tempo-
rary contract or license is not the only example to which the model applies.
As a second example, one may think of an employer using subjective per-
formance evaluations in order to motivate and reward his employees. Here,
an employee may engage in costly inuence activities in order to shift his
superiors judgment in a favorable direction.5 Following the arguments made
before, the amount of inuence activities may clearly depend on how often
the employees are evaluated and rewarded. Alternatively, the model may
also be thought of as to describe a vertically organized production process,
where a downstream rm governs the supply of an input with an upstream
rm contractually. Then, the upstream rms may engage in rent seeking in
order to be assigned the contract. Again, the contract length may crucially
a¤ect the rent-seeking decision.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, the basic model is
described. Section 3 solves the model in a situation, where the rms are not
able to enter a cooperation. In Section 4, such a cooperation is introduced
into the analysis. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Description of the model and notation
Consider a game with an open time-horizon (i.e. t = 1; 2; :::), where all
players - a governmental agency and N rms - share a common discount
factor  2 (0; 1). In each period, one of the rms provides a service for the
agency and receives a net payo¤ of S > 0. This service is governed by a
5Inuence activities are a special form of rent seeking. They are of particular relevance,
if superiors in a rm have some discretion concerning their subordinatescompensations.
See, for instance, Milgrom (1988) or Kräkel (2006).
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contract of length T 2 1; 2; :::; T	, where T is determined by the agency at
the beginning of the game and after the old contract has expired, respectively.
We assume that the contract must not be longer than T , which could be
justied by other e¢ ciency considerations (besides rent seeking) that are not
explicitly modeled.
If a new contract has to be assigned, the rms compete for this contract
and choose rent-seeking expenditures xi  0, i = 1; :::; N . Accordingly, rm
i is awarded the contract with probability6
Pi =
8><>:
f(xi)PN
j=1
f(xj)
; if
PN
j=1 f(xj) > 0
1
N
; otherwise
(1)
Here, f () is a strictly increasing function satisfying f (0)  0 and not being
too convex. Specically, we assume f 00 (xi)
PN
j=1 f(xj)   2 (f 0 (xi))2 < 0
8xi; xj  0, which guarantees that the rmsobjective functions are strictly
concave.
The agency is interested in maximizing social welfare. Therefore, it de-
termines T such that the present value of the total rent-seeking outlays and,
accordingly, the social waste is minimized.7 The rms choose their rent-
seeking expenditures in order to maximize the present value of prots.
6See e.g. Skaperdas (1996).
7One may also think that the agency benets from rent seeking and so tries to maximize
it. In this case, its optimal decision as determined in Propositions 1 and 2 is simply
reversed.
5
3 Model solution, if cooperation is not possi-
ble
In this section, we assume the parameter constellations to be such that no co-
operation between the rms is sustainable. Bearing this in mind, we consider
the beginning of the game and suppose that T has already been determined.
Furthermore, we denote by ST the total value of the contract for each of the
rms. Then, rm i chooses its rent-seeking outlay such that
i =
f (xi)PN
j=1 f(xj)
ST   xi (2)
is maximized. We assume that an interior solution to this problem exists,
which requires S to be nite, but su¢ ciently high. If this is the case, the
solution is characterized by the following rst-order condition (the second-
order condition is satised):
f 0 (xi)
P
j 6=i f(xj)PN
j=1 f(xj)
2 ST   1 = 0 (3)
For any other rm j 6= i, we obtain the rst-order condition analogously.
Comparing all rst-order conditions, one can directly see that there is a
symmetric equilibrium (i.e. x1 = ::: = xN =: x), which is implicitly given
by
(N   1)f 0 (x)
N2f(x)
ST   1 = 0; (4)
or, dening h (y) :=

f
f 0
 1
(y), by
x = h

(N   1)
N2
ST

(5)
Let us now consider the agencys optimization problem. This can be
6
stated as8
Min
T
PVT = Nh

(N   1)
N2
ST
 
1 + T + 2T + :::

(6)
Note that we can rewrite ST as S 1 
T
1  and 1 + 
T + 2T + ::: as 1
1 T . The
present value of the rent-seeking outlays can thus be rewritten as
PVT = Nh

(N   1)
N2
S
1  T
1  

1
1  T (7)
This latter expression nicely reects the trade-o¤ that the agency faces. On
the one hand, a longer contract is more valuable for the rms so that each
expends more resources, if a contract has to be assigned. On the other hand,
a longer contract is assigned less often, which obviously mitigates the rent-
seeking problem.
From (7), one can see that the solution to the agencys minimization
problem depends on the curvature of h (). The following proposition makes
this argument more precise:
Proposition 1 Let f (0) = 0. Then, the agency chooses T = 1
 
T = T

, if
h () is strictly convex (concave). If h () is linear, the agency is indi¤erent
between all T 2 1; 2; :::; T	.
Proof. First recall that h (y) is dened as

f
f 0
 1
(y). From f (0) = 0, it
follows that f
f 0 (0) = 0 since f
0 () > 0. As the graph of h (y) is the reection
about the line y = x of the graph of f
f 0 (x), we have h (0) = 0, too. The
easiest case to handle is the case of a linear function h (y) ; which means that
h (y) = ky, with k = const:. Here, PVT can be written as
PVT = Nk
(N   1)
N2
S
1  T
1  
1
1  T = k
(N   1)
N
S
1
1   ;
8Note that the agencys problem does not change over time. Therefore, we can assume
w.l.o.g. that it sets the same T for every contract to be assigned.
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which is clearly independent of T . Therefore, the agency is indi¤erent be-
tween all possible contract durations.
Assume now that h () is strictly convex. In this case, we show that
PV1 < PV2. The proof that PV1 < PVt, for t = 3; 4; :::; T , is completely
analogous. Dene PV as PV2   PV1. Hence, we have
PV = N

h

(N   1)
N2
S
1  2
1  

1
1  2   h

(N   1)
N2
S

1
1  

Notice that h () being strictly convex means that
h (tu+ (1  t) v) < th (u) + (1  t)h (v) ;
for any t 2 (0; 1) and u 6= v. Now let t = 1 
1 2 , u =
(N 1)
N2
S 1 
2
1  and v = 0.
Then, the convexity condition implies
h

1  
1  2
(N   1)
N2
S
1  2
1   +

1  1  
1  2

0

<
1  
1  2h

(N   1)
N2
S
1  2
1  

+

1  1  
1  2

h (0) ;
or, equivalently,
h

(N   1)
N2
S

1
1   < h

(N   1)
N2
S
1  2
1  

1
1  2
From the last condition, we see that PV is strictly positive and the agency
prefers T = 1 to T = 2. As mentioned before, the same argumentation
applies, if we compare the situation T = 1 to a situation, where the contract
lasts for three or more periods. Hence, if h () is strictly convex, the agency
sets T = 1.
If h () is strictly concave, we have
h (tu+ (1  t) v) > th (u) + (1  t)h (v) ;
for any t 2 (0; 1) and u 6= v. From the previous analysis, it directly follows
that T = T is optimal for the agency.
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Proposition 1 is very intuitive. It states that the optimal contract dura-
tion depends on whether a rms rent-seeking expenditure is a concave, linear
or convex function of the contract value. If it is concave, the (marginal) e¤ect
of a higher contract valuation on the rent-seeking outlay is decreasing. Ac-
cordingly, the disadvantage of a longer contract in form of higher rent seeking
at a contract assignment stage loses some of its impact. This implies that the
longest possible contract is optimal. A similar argumentation holds, if h ()
is linear or convex. In the former case, the contract length does not a¤ect
the present value of rent-seeking outlays, as rent seeking increases linearly
in the contract valuation. In the latter case, a higher contract value has an
increasing (marginal) e¤ect on the rent-seeking expenditures. Consequently,
a long-term contract leads to excessively high social waste and a short-term
contract with T = 1 is optimal.
Remark 1 If f (0) > 0, we have h (0) < 0 implying that the results from the
proposition are shifted in the direction of a shorter contract. In particular, a
contract with T = 1 is strictly optimal, even if h () is linear.
We conclude this section with three examples that help to provide a better
understanding of the results derived before.
Example 1 In the rst example, we consider a widely-used contest-success
function, where f1 (xi) = x

i ;  2 (0; 1]. It is straightforward to see that
f1
f 01
(xi) =
xi

and, accordingly, h1 (y) = y. Hence, h1 () is linear so that
Proposition 1 implies the governmental agency to be indi¤erent between all
T 2 1; :::; T	.
Example 2 In the second example, f2 (xi) = xi + k; k > 0. In analogy to
the rst example, we can easily show that f2
f 02
(xi) = xi + k. Consequently,
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h2 () is given by the linear function h2 (y) = y   k. Applying Remark 1, we
can see that the agency chooses T = 1.
Example 3 In Example 3, we have f3 (xi) = axi x2i ; for xi < 0:5a (a > 0)
and f3 (xi) = a
2
4
; otherwise.9 Assuming xi < 0:5a, it follows that
f3
f 03
(xi) =
axi x2i
a 2xi . After a few calculations, one obtains
10 h3 (y) =
2y+a
2
 
q
4y2+a2
4
,
which is strictly concave, as h003 < 0. Consequently, Proposition 3 tells us
that T = T is the optimal policy for the agency.
4 Model solution, if cooperation is possible
In the previous section, each rm chose a positive rent-seeking expenditure
and was assigned the contract with probability 1
N
. Obviously, the rms
would do better, if each did not engage in rent seeking, as the winning-
probabilities did not change, but the rent-seeking expenditures were saved.
In the following, we will analyze, whether such a cooperation is sustainable.
To do so, we assume that rm i can observe, whether rm j 6= i chooses
xj > 0 or xj = 0, i.e. whether or not rm j engages in rent seeking. This
means that the rms can enter a cooperation, under which each promises to
choose xi = 0.
The rms use a Grim-Trigger strategy to sustain the cooperation. Roughly
speaking, they start by cooperating and continue to do so unless one party
defects. In the latter case, the rms refuse to cooperate forever after and
switch to the solution described in Section 2. The agency observes, whether
9Note that f3 () is only weakly, but not strictly increasing. This, however, is not
problematic, as f 03 (0) > 0 and the optimal solution always lies at the strictly increasing
part of f3 () :
10Note that 2y+a2  
q
4y2+a2
4 is indeed smaller than 0:5a.
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the rms cooperate or not. Accordingly, if it observes that cooperation breaks
down, it changes the contract duration to its optimal value as determined in
the previous section. This value is denoted by ~T , while the corresponding
rent-seeking expenditure by each of the rms is ~x.
To solve the model, suppose the agency to have chosen a contract of
length T . Notice that cooperation is only sustainable, if each rm is gain
from deviating is overcompensated by the triggered costs. A rm gains from
deviating to a positive rent-seeking outlay x^iT > 0 by becoming more likely
to be assigned the present contract. Formally, the gain can thus be written
as
GT = ST

f (x^iT )
f (x^iT ) + (N   1)f(0)  
1
N

  x^iT (8)
The following lemma describes the relation between GT and T :
Lemma 1 GT is strictly increasing in T .
Proof. From the denition of ST , ST = S 1 
T
1  , it can directly be seen that
ST increases in T . Hence, if T increases and the deviating rm does not
change x^iT , GT becomes higher. Moreover, as the rm changes x^iT , only if
this change pays o¤ (in the sense that GT must further increase), it directly
follows that GT must necessarily get higher, if T is increased.
The lemma states that the gain from the deviation is increasing in the
contract length. This is intuitive. If a rm deviates, it becomes more likely
to be assigned the current governmental contract. If this contract is longer,
its value for the rm is higher so that the rm gains relatively stronger from
the deviation.
Let us now consider the costs that a deviation from the cooperative agree-
ment entails. If a rm deviates from the agreement, cooperation between the
rms break down. This implies that, starting with the next contract, the
11
rms switch to the solution from the previous section, which, as mentioned
before, is characterized by a contract duration ~T and rent-seeking outlay ~x.
Hence, the costs of a deviation from the cooperation are given by
CT = 
T

1
N
ST
 
1 + T + 2T + :::
   1
N
S ~T   ~x

1 + 
~T + 2
~T + :::

(9)
, CT = T

~x
1   ~T

From the expression in the lower line of (9), we directly obtain the second
lemma:
Lemma 2 The costs of deviating from the cooperation, CT , are strictly de-
creasing in T .
Lemma 2 is very intuitive, too. If a rm deviates from the cooperation,
it is punished by the other rms from the next contract assignment stage
on. If the current contract is rather long, it takes considerable time until
the next contract has to be assigned. In other words, the punishment occurs
later. Therefore, the punishment is less strong (or more heavily discounted)
so that the costs of a deviation are lower.11
Summarizing, we have seen that a relatively longer contract increases
a rms direct gain from reneging on the cooperative agreement, while the
corresponding costs become lower. It directly follows that a shorter contract
facilitates the sustainability of the cooperation. This is formalized in the
following proposition:
Proposition 2 Let the minimal discount factor, which allows to sustain the
cooperation under a contract of duration T , be denoted by ^T . Then, ^1 <
11Sasaki & Strausz (2006) nd a similar e¤ect analyzing the sustainability of implicit
cartels.
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^2 < ^3 < :::. Hence, the cooperation is most easily sustainable, if T = 1.
For   ^1, T = 1 is also the (weakly) optimal contract length. Otherwise, a
cooperation is not feasible and the results from Proposition 1 apply.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, it was analyzed, whether an agency could mitigate rent seeking
for a governmental contract by changing the contract length. Such a change
was shown to entail three e¤ects on the rent-seeking behavior. First, a longer
contract leads to more rent seeking at a contract assignment stage, as the
rms value the contract higher. Second, however, the contract has to be
assigned less often so that rent seeking occurs less often, too. Finally, a longer
contract makes a cooperative agreement solving the rent-seeking problem
more di¢ cult to sustain. Building on these e¤ects, we determined the optimal
contract length that the agency should choose.
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